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Policy makers, local land use planners, and developers have long struggled with the 
NIMBY (“not in my backyard”) syndrome in their efforts to site locally undesirable but socially 
beneficial facilities.   Because projects such as homeless shelters, prisons, airports, and waste 
disposal sites typically produce widely dispersed benefits but concentrated costs, these facilities 
have often provoked intense resistance from local residents.  Since the mid-1970s, however, 
the NIMBY problem has become more than a common nuisance, as certain facilities thought to 
be essential to society have become nearly impossible to site due to organized and persistent 
public opposition.  Some noteworthy illustrations include the growing inability to site hazardous 
waste treatment facilities in the U.S., the all but abandoning of nuclear power by U.S. utility 
companies, and the Department of Energy’s persistent difficulties in selecting a permanent site 
for high-level radioactive waste (DiMento & Graymer 1991, Cohen, McCubbins, & Rosenbluth 
1995).  For solid and hazardous waste facilities (hereafter, WFs), the siting problem has 
become so acute that one policy maker has suggested that the “NIMBY” syndrome is perhaps 
better characterized as “BANANA” -- “build absolutely nothing anywhere near anything” 
(Lambert & Boerner, 1997).
1
In an effort to facilitate the building of locally undesirable but socially beneficial facilities, 
states across the country have enacted numerous siting regulations.  The specific nature of 
these reforms varies widely from relatively simple efforts to improve information exchange 
between developers and prospective host communities to more interventionist measures that 
give state officials the power to assume control over the siting of controversial facilities.   Today, 
numerous states have in place detailed siting procedures whose primary purpose is to 
overcome NIMBY problems.
Academic observers have primarily focused their energies on debating the efficacy of
these regulations.  Few researchers have attempted to understand the underlying logic of 
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government regulation with respect to the NIMBY problem: what is the nature of the problem 
that prompts the necessity of siting regulations; what are the key attributes of these regulations 
that address the core of the NIMBY problem; and what factors (if any) constitute an efficient 
regulatory response for a given instance.  The purpose of this paper is to begin outlining a 
model of regulation with respect to the siting of WFs, such as landfills, solid waste incinerators, 
and hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities.
2 The basic premises motivating 
this paper are threefold.  First, the NIMBY issue can be formulated as a contracting problem in 
which a WF developer and a prospective host community negotiate over the terms and 
conditions under which a facility will be allowed to operate.  Second, the very nature of these 
transactions introduces certain contractual hazards that preclude efficient bargaining.  And 
third, this contracting problem can be understood through the lens of transaction cost 
economics (TCE), which predicts that hierarchical mechanisms of governance (e.g. contracts, 
the firm, government control, etc.) arise to support transactions burdened by hazards. The 
central argument is fashioned after TCE’s “discriminating alignment hypothesis” (Williamson 
1996): transactions (i.e. siting WF activities), which differ in their attributes, are aligned with 
governance structures (i.e. various regulations), which differ in their costs and competencies, in 
a discriminating way.  We apply this model to WF siting regulations and argue that proper (i.e. 
transaction cost minimizing) alignment can help overcome the NIMBY problem and lead to 
siting Pareto improving facilities.
Section I of this paper presents an overview of the NIMBY scenario and specifies the 
political and economic problems that NIMBY disputes present.  Section II reviews the current 
NIMBY literature and outlines how TCE analysis can inform our understanding of NIMBY 
regulation.  Section III develops a TCE approach to the NIMBY problem and formulates TCE-
1 For a general discussion of the problems siting WFs, see DiMento (1991) and O’Hare (1983).
2 Waste and energy facilities were chosen for 2 reasons:  First, these facilities have been among the most intensely 
opposed land uses; and second, this notoriety has led to a large body of literature upon which this paper could 
build.
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motivated hypotheses for how certain types of regulatory mechanisms can efficiently minimize 
transaction costs for certain corresponding WFs.  Section IV presents a preliminary empirical 
test of these hypotheses by introducing selected case studies, which, while incomplete, indicate 
that viewing regulation as a mode of governance can provide valuable insights.  Section V 
discusses opportunities for future work and provides concluding remarks.
SECTION I: THE NIMBY PROBLEM
I.1  NIMBY AS A POLITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEM
A NIMBY can be defined as a proposed land use that offers benefits to a broad group of 
people yet is difficult or impossible to site because of local opposition.  While most often 
associated with polluting and waste facilities, NIMBY problems afflict a broad range of activities, 
including airports, prisons, sports stadiums, power plants, halfway houses, and low-income 
housing projects.
Two important characteristics make each of these facilities a potential NIMBY problem. 
The first is that the project, if implemented, will generate an overall increase to social surplus.
3
We define NIMBY problems as projects that are difficult to site only because of inequalities in 
distribution.  Consequently, a NIMBY project generates additional surplus such that efficient 
transfer payments could, in theory, distribute gains in a manner that will entice all actors to 
support it.  All NIMBY projects are potentially Pareto improving.
Second, the nature of the costs and benefits associated with these facilities virtually 
assures the existence of local opposition.  While the benefits of NIMBY projects, such as 
airports, prisons and low income housing, are typically dispersed among a relatively large 
population, the costs and risks of these projects are normally concentrated on a small group of 
residents in the host community.  To residents who live close to these facilities, the costs are 
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almost always greater than their benefits, and they are usually better off if the project is either 
located elsewhere or not completed at all.
Even though NIMBY projects benefit more actors than they harm, and even though they 
generate an overall gain in social surplus, the nature of democratic institutions makes it 
extremely difficult for them to win political support.   Consequently, they often succumb to a 
political process that favors concentrated costs over diffuse benefits.  Citizens residing near 
proposed sites for NIMBY facilities can both experience nuisances associated with the facilities 
(e.g. noise from airports) and can also fear suffering from such nuisances (O’Hare 1997).  Their 
actual and anticipated exposure to such concentrated costs provides strong incentives to 
organize, attend local hearings, lobby politicians and, if necessary, file legal challenges.  In 
contrast, the benefits associated with these facilities are both broadly distributed (e.g. the 
benefits of an airport are spread to all travelers) and, compared to the local costs, diffusely 
allocated (the utility of the ability to travel is far outweighed by the disutility of constantly hearing 
airplanes overhead; it also is insufficient to induce an individual to volunteering in the political 
process and fighting on behalf of an airport project).  Consequently, few individuals aside from 
a project’s developer have an incentive to advocate that any given site under consideration is 
the best site (Bacow & Milkey 1982).  Even the developer’s attempts to argue that the overall 
gains outweigh the overall costs are often dismissed by opponents as self-serving.  
Consequently, widespread public support of locally undesirable land uses is generally lacking 
and is overcome by local opposition (Olson 1965). This opposition is frequently sufficient to 
defeat most locally undesirable facilities, including those that provide net social benefits 
(O’Hare, Bacow, & Sanderson 1983).
These two conditions – overall efficiency but prone to stifling political opposition – are 
particularly evident in the siting of WFs.  Economies of scale resulting from the large fixed costs 
3 One important qualification must be noted.  Any of these facilities can be planned inefficiently – i.e. can be 
constructed and sited in such a manner that they generate a decline in total surplus.  A project’s qualification as a 
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associated with most WFs typically make it efficient to have one large facility servicing the 
waste needs of an entire region (Kunreuther & Kleindorfer, 1985).  However, the actual and 
perceived costs to neighbors associated with these facilities increase with facility size, so larger 
(and more efficient) WFs often elicit stronger public opposition than would small facilities.  
Large regional facilities also encounter local hostility since residents perceive that they are 
bearing the costs of disposing of “other people’s” waste (O'Looney, 1995).
4  Furthermore, unlike 
projects such as airports and various industrial activities that can spark additional investment, 
WFs normally provide few compensating benefits to their host communities.  Most WFs, for 
instance, provide relatively few new jobs and only modest tax revenues (Popper, 1991; Bacow 
& Milkey 1982).  With few concentrated benefits for local residents, it is difficult for a WF 
developer to rally host community support.  
Chances for public support for siting WF facilities have been further injured by recent 
political developments.  The industry’s past failures to use environmentally sound waste 
disposal practices and the public fallout associated with many of these failures (e.g. Love 
Canal, Times Beach, the Santa Barbara oil fires, etc.) have severely damaged WF developers 
credibility in the public eye.
5  Moreover, a large, vocal, and well-funded environmental 
movement has heightened public anxiety about the dangers posed by WFs and has become an 
important force in challenging new developments (Bacow & Milkey 1982; Inhaber 1992; 
O'Looney, 1995).  As a result, WFs are often perceived to pose greater risks to public health 
and safety than other locally undesirable facilities and are especially prone to NIMBY political 
problems. 
NIMBY problem depends not just on the nature of the facility itself but also on contributing circumstances.
4 Larger facilities also distort traditional, common-law approaches to solving land-use disputes.  As the magnitude 
of a nuisance increases, the number of affected persons increases.  With multiple parties, common-law 
approaches to solving nuisance disputes become less efficient.  The transaction costs associated with negotiating 
agreements increases geometrically as the number of people involved in the process increases.  For a more 
thorough discussion of how traditional approaches to solving NIMBY problems have become less efficient, see 
O'Looney (1995).
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Combined, these features present WFs as a good vehicle to understand the NIMBY 
problem.    While efficient siting of WFs encourages developers to build large facilities in one 
locale that service many other communities, the costs of siting large projects are shared 
unequally and create political dynamics that make them hard to attract the requisite public 
support.  The challenge this NIMBY problem presents to policy makers is to create a political 
process that will site socially necessary facilities in an economically efficient way. As a result, a 
variety of public and private policies have emerged to respond to this political challenge.
I.2   RESPONSES TO NIMBY
Two key developments have emerged in an effort to counter the problems associated 
with siting WFs..  First, private developers fundamentally changed their approach to siting WFs.  
Traditionally, developers sited facilities using what has been termed the “DAD” paradigm: 
decide, announce and defend.  Developers decided the best location for their facility, took out 
options on the land, announced to political leaders of the community their intention to site, and 
then defended their decisions from local opposition groups (Lambert & Boerner 1997).  In the 
face of increasing NIMBY opposition, developers began voluntarily negotiating with 
representatives of prospective host communities in the hope of eliminating the causes of local 
opposition (OBS 1983).
6 While the siting agreements that result from these negotiations vary, 
most agreements commit the developer to undertake certain actions to mitigate adverse 
impacts and compensate residents.  These agreements also spell out certain compensation the 
community is to receive, plus particular obligations the community may assume regarding the 
sited project .
7 The mixed success of these negotiations between developers and concerned 
5 Civil rights activists have recently joined forces with environmental groups to oppose many SFs on 
environmental justice grounds.  See Lambert & Boerner (1997).
6 Also, interview with William Ruckelshaus, CEO, Browning Ferris Industries.  St. Louis, Missouri, April 28, 
1995.
7 Among the mitigating activities that are often included in siting agreements are the creation of a buffer zone 
around the facility, providing necessary infrastructure, such as a transportation network or a sewer system, 
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local parties has motivated a second development to counter NIMBY problems, the 
promulgation of state siting regulations (OBS 1983, O’Hare & Sanderson 1993).  This 
generation of regulations was fashioned to assist these negotiations and to encourage similar 
negotiation for situations where bargaining was otherwise difficult.  Most of these regulations 
were directed toward (a) improving the exchange of information between developers of WFs 
and key constituents within prospective host communities, (b) altering the process by which 
developers and local community representatives negotiate, and (c) allowing the state to directly 
intervene in the siting process.  As will be discussed in further detail in Section III, these 
regulations can arise to support siting WFs when simple (i.e. unaided by regulations or other 
institutional mechanisms) negotiations would be insufficient, and they can be understood as a 
hybrid form of governance that support certain transactions with burdening hazards.  We will 
argue that these regulations are efficient – i.e. minimize transaction costs and support welfare-
improving agreements – when they are appropriately designed to mitigate targeted contracting 
hazards.  We first review the academic literature that has addressed the role of government 
regulation in administering siting disputes.
SECTION II: LITERATURE REVIEW – REGULATION AS A SOLUTION TO NIMBY
The rise of certain regulations as response to siting difficulties has attracted significant 
attention from academics.  The resulting scholarly literature can be divided into three camps. 
One camp employs normative approaches that advocate assorted (mostly non-regulatory) 
resolutions to NIMBY siting problems, a second camp uses economic models of the political 
process to generate positive predictions of regulatory outcomes, and a third school uses 
providing emergency response capabilities, and agreements to use cleaner technologies.  Compensation 
payments may be direct cash payments to the community, financial assistance in the construction of various 
community projects, the provision of parks, as well as promises of jobs and job training.  In return for these 
steps, the community often pledges to support the project and provide various support services (Interview with 
William Ruckelshaus, CEO, Browning Ferris Industries.  St. Louis, Missouri, April 28, 1995).
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economic principles to explain how regulations can economize on transactions and other costs.  
We review each in turn.
II.1 NORMATIVE APPROACHES
A common response to understanding solutions to the NIMBY problem is to formulate 
mechanisms that will be able to overcome inevitable political opposition and site socially 
necessary facilities in an economically efficient way.  Two main approaches to the problem are 
evident.  The first branch can be labeled the “mechanism design school” in which a number of 
researchers have directed their efforts toward critiquing existing government regulations and 
designing alternative siting mechanisms.  Howard Kunreuther’s (1985; 1986) work on sealed-
bid auction mechanisms for siting noxious facilities, Herbert Inhaber’s (1992; 1998) proposals to 
employ a reverse Dutch auction, and Michael O’Hare’s (1983; 1993) research on the use of 
compensation schemes are noteworthy examples of this approach.  While critical of current 
siting processes, researchers in this branch maintain that appropriate government programs 
can reduce or eliminate current siting difficulties.
A growing literature within the field of negotiation can also fall into the mechanism 
design school.  Resting on theories from an amalgam of fields, such as economics, psychology, 
and political science, this collection of research scrutinizes common bargaining strategies 
employed by developers and host communities.  These works identify certain elements of the 
negotiation or mediation process that create gridlock, and they proceed to develop normative 
approaches to aid developers in negotiating with host communities.  Many of these strategic 
recommendations include entering into a “consensual approach” that encourage participants to 
create a voluntary, ad-hoc discussion forum to resolve disputes (Suskind & Cruikshank 1987, 
Suskind, Levy, & Thomas-Larmer 2000). Other works encourage employing public mediators 
who can formalize an alternative dispute resolution mechanism (Carpenter 1991).  Most of this 
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literature presupposes that negotiation strategies can arrive at Pareto-improving resolutions 
when one is theoretically possible, and the challenge is to encourage parties to commit to a 
negotiation process and collectively explore value-creating options.
The second branch of normative research, which could be called the “property rights” 
school, is far less optimistic about government siting solutions.  According to these scholars, 
the siting problem is one of ambiguously specified property rights.  Robert Cameron Mitchell 
and Richard T. Carson (1986), for instance, argue that under current siting regulations neither 
the developer nor the community holds clear property rights.  While local communities have 
asserted the right to be free of these projects through strict zoning and safety regulations, state 
siting boards have typically countered these efforts by granting siting rights to developers.  
Mitchell and Carson suggest that states should officially recognize the de facto property rights 
assumed by local communities and allow prospective developers to freely negotiate siting terms 
with these communities.  This argument is extended by law and economics scholars who focus 
on selecting a legal rule, usually assigning property rights or liability, in order to achieve optimal 
incentives.  Most of these arguments presuppose that once property rights are specified, court 
adjudication is sufficient to identify when siting agreements have been violated, assess the 
behavior of the responsible actors, assign liability, and, where required, compensate victims 
(Landes & Posner 1987, Posner 1992, Shavell 1987).
8
While both of these approaches provide important insights into the NIMBY problem, they 
are inadequate in a number of respects.  First, many of the critiques of existing siting 
regulations appear to be making efficiency judgments in comparison to hypothetical or untested 
ideals.  Many authors, for instance, describe existing siting mechanisms as “inadequate,” “ill-
informed” or “inefficient.”  However, it is not clear what comparisons are actually being made in 
these critiques: existing siting regulations are “inefficient” or “inadequate” compared to what?  It 
is easy to point out how siting regulations, or any government intervention, would generate 
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inefficiencies in a perfectly efficient market with costless negotiations, chiefly because they 
directly interfere with any “invisible hand” that a free market may offer.  But such neoclassical 
assumptions don’t consider the complex realities of negotiating certain transactions and 
overlook fundamental bargaining hazards that preclude laissez-faire efficiency. Thus, when 
explicit comparisons are made, existing siting regulations are normally compared to 
hypothetical or untested ideals to which few markets can aspire and against which no regulation 
can compete.  
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the dangers of hypothetical comparisons is seen in 
Lawrence Bacow’s and James Milkey’s suggestion that traditional siting approaches are 
inadequate compared to incentive (e.g. compensation) schemes (1982).  To bolster their case 
that an incentive-based approach produces better results, Bacow and Milkey appeal to a 
Massachusetts statute that requires hazardous waste facility developers to negotiate 
compensation packages with prospective host communities.  Unfortunately, the purported 
improvements offered by these incentive approaches have not materialized.  As Michael O’Hare 
and Deborah Sanderson (1993) point out, Massachusetts has not seen any improvement in the 
siting process since the negotiation statute was enacted.  Indeed, no new hazardous waste 
facilities have been sited since the statute was passed in 1980 despite a significant demand 
(O’Hare & Sanderson 1993).  Without discounting the contribution made by Bacow’s and 
Milkey’s article, it is clear in this instance that claims regarding the inadequacies of the 
traditional siting process are in need of qualification.  They overlook the contracting hazards 
inherent in siting WFs, and the market-oriented incentive approach they advocate has 
apparently been inadequate in overcoming political opposition.
Second, it is not obvious that many alternatives to traditional siting approaches are 
feasible.  Robert Cameron Mitchell’s and Richard T. Carson’s (1986) proposal to eliminate local 
opposition by establishing communal property rights, which would allow communities to accept 
8 For a discussion of this approach and potential flaws in addressing environmental problems, see Menell (1991).
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or reject a proposed WF, is a case in point.  While the argument may have some theoretical 
appeal, precisely how does one provide a community with clearly defined and enforceable 
property rights with respect to a new development?  A law specifying the use of referenda for 
the approval of new developments is one alternative.  However, proponents of such a proposal 
must specify why communities and developers would desire such a referenda process and 
what, if anything, would prevent individual community members from engaging in various legal 
and extra-legal tactics to end-run the referendum process and stop an approved development.  
Another approach, as some negotiation literature suggests, could appoint neighborhood leaders 
to represent the interests and exercise the property rights of the host community. But this too is 
equally vulnerable to opportunities for defection and non-cooperation by smaller factions. 
Before one can assess the usefulness of a property rights approach, proponents must specify 
how their approach addresses such nontrivial issues as credibility and enforcement.  Given the 
complexity of the political process, any effective mechanism must survive a microanalytic 
examination in which actors’ incentives and opportunities for non-cooperation are considered at 
every stage.  The academic pursuit for developing such a mechanism may involve beginning 
with a consideration of discrete structural alternatives rather than a hypothetical ideal.
Finally, most of the proposals to deal with NIMBY problems attempt to establish a one-
size-fits all solution.  However, as will be discussed below, the problems associated with siting 
an airport are not the same as the problems associated with siting a nuclear power plant.  
Asymmetric information, complexity, and other contractual hazards are at the heart of many 
NIMBY disputes, but these hazards vary significantly according to the type of facility in 
question.  Recognizing these differences, policies designed to deal with one NIMBY dispute 
may be ill suited to deal with other disputes.  Recognition of this variation in transactions, and 
subsequent variation in corresponding governance mechanisms, is central to the approach 
discussed in the following section.
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In short, much of the normative literature dealing with NIMBY problems fails to 
recognize that all conceivable regulatory mechanisms designed to govern siting transactions 
will be flawed when compared to a hypothetical ideal.  If the bargaining process is laden with 
contractual hazards, then the unregulated market (no matter how creative the negotiation 
process, and no matter how enlightened the governing legal doctrine) is unlikely to arrive at the 
Pareto frontier. In fact, the converse is a better formulation of the problem: there is a need for 
regulation precisely because the contracting hazards block the hypothetical ideal. A better 
approach is to evaluate distinct structural alternatives by a remediableness standard, where 
mechanisms must balance efficiency motives with the realistic hazards of political opportunism. 
II.2 POSITIVE POLITICAL APPROACHES
A second approach to understanding the emergence of regulation in response to NIMBY 
disputes involves a positive, and perhaps slightly cynical, view of the political process.  
According to this approach, political interest groups organize to influence the development of 
regulatory rules, aiming to enact rules that would best meet their particularistic interests.  This 
school has its roots in George Stigler’s (1971) and Sam Peltzman’s (1976) examinations of 
regulated industries, and it has burgeoned to study how numerous regulatory and political 
processes are shaped by institutional configurations and a political market for votes.
9  Positive
political theory would predict that WF siting regulation has emerged to meet the particularistic 
needs of developers and organized community interests (whether environmental groups, civil 
rights groups, or some organized combination thereof).  It would further predict that the 
regulations would favor the organized groups that are endowed, and thus invest, the greatest 
amount of resources in the political process.  
9 See, e.g., Kalt & Zupan 1984, Snyder 1990.  This is a very large school of literature, and we intend only to 
introduce it briefly here.
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We think that the positive political approach is a strong way to understand regulatory 
outcomes, and we anticipate that these hypotheses have strong explanatory value should be 
considered in a broader analysis of siting regulations.  However, we do not focus on this 
approach in this paper.  Our emphasis is on understanding regulation as an efficient 
governance mechanism that arises to support difficult contracting, and a positive examination of 
power and resources in the political process would obscure that objective.  We further believe 
that putting aside positive political considerations will not heavily affect our analysis.  First, as 
we discussed above, the political interests that are compelled to enter into a NIMBY dispute are 
developers and activists from the host community.  Since these two groups arguably have 
opposed interests and arguably are both well endowed (in money and votes), there is reason to 
believe that their gridlock in the unorganized political process would translate into another 
political stalemate in influencing regulatory outcomes.  In other words, the political impacts of
these two organized interests may counteract each other.  Second, these siting regulations are 
designed precisely to incorporate the political conflict into the siting process, so any political 
fight in lobbying policy makers will mirror the same dispute that is governed by the regulations 
we examine.  Third, as we will explain below, our analysis does not assume ex-post efficiency. 
Consequently, even if the political process inhibits an efficient regulatory outcome, the 
regulation will still be subject to the same theoretical considerations and will not confuse our 
results.  We will be able to measure the efficiency of all outcomes according to the theoretical 
criteria that we develop below.
While we agree that political power can explain a good portion of regulatory outcomes, 
we believe it deserves its own examination.  Accordingly, we leave a positive political analysis of 
siting regulatory outcomes for future research.
II.3  TRANSACTION COST APPROACHES
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art1014
Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) offers an alternative approach to understanding 
NIMBY problems and their regulatory remedies.  While much of the research in TCE has 
focused on the firm-market boundary, the theory has broader applicability (Klein & Shelanski 
1995, Boerner & Macher, 2000).  TCE maintains that any problem that arises as or can be 
posed as a contracting problem can be examined in transaction cost economics terms 
(Williamson, 1996).  Thus, to the extent that one can think of regulation as a response to a 
contracting problem, TCE analysis can be usefully brought to bear.  
Works by Victor Goldberg and Oliver Williamson (1976) are credited for being the first to 
approach regulation as a response to transactions that were difficult to contract.  Goldberg 
(1976) chastised critics of regulation (many of whom could now fall into the normative schools 
discussed above) for not appreciating the contractual complexity of private alternatives.  
Hazards inherent in the nature of commonly regulated activities make most private alternatives 
non-remediable, leading instead to ”administered contracts” that often involve intervention from 
a public agency to provide long-term administrative supports.  Williamson (1976) fleshes out 
these contracting difficulties in examining efforts to provide the city of Oakland cable television.  
The transactions involved in such a fixed-cost endeavor for a municipality were laden with 
contractual hazards motivated by both economic and political circumstances.  Williamson 
concludes that the (comparatively) efficient mechanism to oversee such economic activity is 
through administrative contracts that allow for public intervention and renegotiation.
Levy and Spiller (1994) and others have since employed TCE analysis to glean various 
insights into the performance implications of regulation and regulatory design.  The general 
approach has followed Goldberg (1976) and Williamson (1976), where specific hazards are 
identified within the microanalytic dynamics of specific transactions, and then corresponding 
governance mechanisms – whether regulation or other institutions – arise to address and 
mitigate those hazards.  This literature has more recently been joined by Dixit (1997) and 
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Williamson (1999), who explicitly characterize regulation as a governance mechanism.  These 
efforts formulate the entire spectrum of public sector activity as an array of transactions, each 
with varied types and degrees of hazards.  Regulation, along with other public institutions, 
arises as a transaction-cost minimizing response to govern certain political and economic 
activities.
This paper pursues the path set forth by the recent work of Dixit and Williamson by 
viewing regulation as akin to a hybrid mode of governance in the markets and hierarchies setup 
of traditional transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1999).  In our formulation, different regulatory 
mechanisms can manifest in a diverse collection of public interventions in the private market, 
and consequently they can possess different governing attributes.  Appendix Figure I, adapted 
from Williamson (1999), illustrates how regulation as a hybrid form fits into traditional TCE 
analysis.  This paper focuses on the different administrative mechanisms that span from the 
regulation node, representing the regulation of a private firm, to the public agency, representing 
public ownership of the particular economic activity (we highlight this Area of Interest in Figure 
I). Utilizing this framework, one can begin to understand the logic of government regulation with 
respect to the NIMBY problem.  Siting WFs is essentially a contracting issue in which a facility 
developer and local residents negotiate the terms and conditions under which a proposed WF 
will be located in a given community.  By our definition, NIMBY projects are potentially Pareto 
improving, so under efficient bargaining (i.e. a world of zero transaction costs) such facilities 
should be easily sited.  Various attributes associated with WFs, however, pose potential 
hazards to these negotiations.  To overcome these hazards and facilitate the siting of these 
socially beneficial facilities, states around the country have enacted siting regulations as 
governance mechanisms.  The analytical process of observing contracting hazards and 
identifying the corresponding governance mechanisms that consequently arise is the essential 
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exercise in TCE.  This process is applied below to siting WFs and their corresponding siting 
regulations.  
SECTION III: A TCE APPROACH TO NIMBY
Applying TCE to understanding siting regulations for WFs involves a three-step process.  
The first step is to articulate the exact nature and degree of the contractual hazards posed by 
WFs and how these hazards can prevent efficient facility siting.  The second is to identify the 
regulatory governance mechanisms that have evolved to deal with these hazards and explain 
how these regulations can facilitate the siting of controversial WFs. The third step is to 
formulate a hypothesis that explains how a proper alignment of regulatory mechanisms with 
specific siting transactions generates efficient returns.
After formulating the siting process as a formal contracting problem, this section 
proceeds through each of these steps. 
III.1 THE CONTRACTING PROBLEM
The agreement to site a WF requires an agreement between the developer and those 
others, mostly local residents, adversely affected.  Lack of an agreement allows local residents 
to sue the developer and claim damages or invade the political process and create gridlock.  
Conversely, an agreement between the developer and those affected can include provisions 
that will avoid imposing costs to residents and appropriately compensating those residents who 
do experience costs.
WFs deemed to be NIMBY projects create additional social surplus so, theoretically, 
transfer payments may be made to appropriately compensate residents for the costs imposed 
by the facility.  In a world of efficient bargaining and zero transaction costs, this is accomplished 
in a strait forward manner: a developer announces a planned facility, local residents will 
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demand compensation for the costs the facility will inflict, and the developer meets each 
resident’s reservation utility through transfer payments.
10
As was mentioned above, many developers now pursue this strategy through 
negotiation (OBS 1983, Suskind & Cruikshank 1987).  Typically, the process of reaching a 
siting agreement begins with negotiations between a developer of a WF and representatives of 
the affected local municipalities, often represented by a citizens committee.  Once the 
committee is established, negotiations over the terms and conditions under which a facility will 
be sited can take place.  Virtually any subject is open for discussion.  Items which have often 
come up in negotiations and are covered in final agreements include: direct payments between 
developers and the affected municipalities, property value protection, disposal privileges, 
availability of local roads and utility services, operation guidelines, creation of standing oversight 
committees and the provision of various community amenities, such as parks and 
playgrounds.
11 Final agreements can also spell out dispute resolution procedures, such as 
appeal to state agencies or the use of binding arbitration (O’Hare 1983).  This simplified 
description outlines how private developers have attempted to address the causes of local 
opposition through negotiating siting agreements.  A successful siting process will typically (1) 
enable the contractual parties to engage in bargaining over the specific terms under which a 
facility will be allowed to operate; (2) provide mechanisms to facilitate adaptation to changing 
conditions over the life of the facility; and (3) establish a means by which parties can enforce 
agreements.  
III.2  HAZARDS
In a world of complete certainty and zero transaction costs, the above conditions are 
easily met.  In such a world, all of the relevant parties are known in advance, all of the effects of 
10 See Coase (1960).
11 List compiled from a review of contracts filed with the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources.
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the facility are known and specified ex ante, and contractual performance is transparent ex 
post.  Thus, fully contingent and binding agreements can be reached.
In reality, all contracts are unavoidably incomplete, and siting WFs are transactions 
laden with hazards.  Faced with this incompleteness, efforts to guard against contractual 
hazards take on added importance.  In the context of siting WFs, a number of potential 
contractual hazards appear to be important.  This paper focuses on three: negotiating 
externalities, measurement problems, and asset specificity.
1. Negotiating Externalities.  Efficient bargaining requires a solid definition of property 
rights (Coase 1960), but when a developer wants to negotiate with a community, it is not 
obvious who deserves standing, i.e. who can reasonably claim to be adversely affected by a 
facility at a specific site.  Moreover, those whom the proposed facility genuinely will harm may 
have different interests and exhibit contrasting demands for compensation.  Thus, one of the 
most important prerequisites to entering negotiations, and one of the first major hurdles facing a 
private developer in the siting process, is determining who represents the community in 
negotiations.
Individual parties within a community, however, have certain incentives not to enter into 
organized bargaining with the rest of the community.  Any party who can claim legal standing 
and can file a legal suit may be able to halt construction of a facility and force direct 
negotiations with the developer.  However, if a developer is confronted with the prospect of 
negotiating individually with each affected party – under the threat from each that a lawsuit 
could suspend the project – then bargaining costs may become insurmountable.  Furthermore, 
some environmentally motivated interest groups may have ulterior motives to stop the project 
altogether, so direct negotiations with them would inevitably prove to be fruitless.  These 
dynamics could be considered “negotiating externalities” since individuals have greater 
incentives to negotiate individually, but individual negotiations may impose insurmountable 
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obstacles to siting a facility that would actually increase overall welfare.  Individual incentives 
alone, without the intervention of governance mechanisms to facilitate negotiations, would lead 
to Pareto-inferior outcomes.
12  Consequently, these externalities impose serious hazards siting 
transactions.
2. Measurement Problems.  A critical point of contention in siting negotiations centers on 
the impact that the proposed facility will have on adjacent natural and human environments.  
Contracting around this issue requires that parties to the agreement (a) understand what 
effects are likely, (b) are aware of the safeguards that are available to remedy these effects, 
and (c) can discern when these safeguards have failed.  However, measurement problems can 
introduce transaction hazards and deter bargaining from accomplishing these goals (Barzel 
1982).  According to Williamson (1975), all measurement problems are traceable to a condition 
of information impactedness, i.e., when information is asymmetrically distributed between 
parties and can be equalized only at great cost.  Information can be similarly impacted if it is 
costly to apprise an arbiter of the true information condition if a dispute arises among equally 
well-informed parties.  
In the context of WFs, measurement problems arise from the inability to effectively 
relate contractual performance and outcomes.  The three conditions listed above that would 
enable contracts to internalize costs to local residents are likely to be absent (in varying 
degrees) in the siting of WFs for two reasons.  First, information is not symmetrically 
distributed.  Developers have much better information about the likely social, economic and 
environmental impacts of proposed facilities than do residents of prospective host communities.  
Public officials and community representatives involved in siting negotiations frequently 
complain that they lack sufficient information to make informed decisions.  There is also a 
12 This is true even factoring the environmental groups into the social-surplus equation.  We recognize that certain 
environmental groups would enjoy more utility if there no facility were built at all, but these preferences diverge 
from those belonging to the host community, who could be better off under transfer payments and a credible 
agreement.
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general suspicion that the information which is provided is selective at best and intentionally 
misleading at worst, meaning that information asymmetry is exacerbated by unaligned 
incentives to share information (OBS 1983, Bacow 1982, Suskind 1996).
Second, the complexity and uncertainty associated with WFs makes leveling the 
information playing field very costly.  WFs operate in a highly complex setting.  Understanding 
and evaluating the risks that these facilities may pose to surrounding environments is a 
complicated process about which there is significant scientific disagreement (Wiener & 
Graham, 1995).  Thus, the general public is frequently left unable to evaluate for itself the likely 
effects of a proposed facility or make sense of the technical and often contradictory analyses of 
others.  Even if one could gather a scientific consensus regarding the potential effects of a 
given facility, long latencies, uncertainty regarding causation, and numerous potentially liable 
parties make it difficult to definitively link the activities of a WF with a particular outcome.         
For transactions in which these two features are prominent, it is difficult to describe fully 
and accurately the responsibilities of each party in the contract ex ante and to assess whether 
these obligations have been fulfilled ex post.  Consequently, parties to the contract have 
opportunities to engage in the strategic withholding of critical information or to engage in efforts 
to evade performance.  A developer, for example, may fail to disclose information about 
adverse consequences of a proposed project or understate the probability that an adverse 
event will occur in order to decrease the compensation payments required to secure the 
support of a prospective host community.  Likewise, host community residents may file false 
claims against a facility in order to extract compensation or achieve desired changes in the 
facility’s operations.
13 Furthermore, even if all parties dutifully fulfill their contractual obligations, 
the mere possibility of each party acting opportunistically gives negotiating partners reason to 
13 Aspects of environmental law make it easier for these superfluous suits to actually get to court.  Under Section 
107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, for example, liability 
for the release of a hazardous substance is based on strict liability and requires no element of causation.  See 
Sullivan (1995) for a discussion of the consequences of this provision.
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worry and not to trust the bargaining process.  In sum, the essential nature of the information 
that is critical to siting WFs creates hazards that hinder parties from making credible 
agreements and thus deter efficient bargaining.
3.  Asset Specificity.  A third hazard that appears to have important organizational 
implications in the siting process is asset specificity.  These hazards arise because constructing 
WFs requires investments in assets that are nonredeployable, so developers will be hesitant to 
begin a project before safeguards can protect the specific investment.
Three types of asset specificity appear to be present.  The first is traditional physical 
asset specificity that is common to the TCE literature (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian 1978).  
Investing in plant equipment for waste disposal may have few alternative uses, so local 
residents or other parties may perceive opportunities to extract quasi rents by threatening legal 
intervention or other hold-ups.  Second, site specificity may be important for several of these 
facilities.  Hazardous and solid waste facilities are often sited in a particular region in 
anticipation of taking most of their input from nearby local waste producers (Boerner & Chilton 
1996).  Once the investment has been made, the developer is essentially locked into a 
relationship.  This resembles a “cheek-by-jowl” relationship that exists with certain coal-fired 
electric generation facilities which are sited next to specific mines from which the majority of 
their coal will be extracted (Joskow 1985, 1996).  In these cases, local interests may attempt to 
capitalize on the inability of these facilities to easily relocate.  Protestors can move to block 
either the facility’s operation or the flow of waste it needs to remain profitable, thus creating two
serious credibility concerns that a developer would want to preempt during the early stages of 
negotiation.
A third type of asset specificity – though one not previously mentioned in the TCE 
literature – could be described as legally-induced asset specificity.  This specificity applies to 
certain hazardous and radioactive waste facilities and results from the peculiar nature of U.S. 
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environmental law.  Under Section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), a current landowner is jointly and severally liable for 
environmental damages caused by facilities on the land.  This liability is imposed regardless of 
whether the landowner had any involvement in handling solid or hazardous waste on the site or 
whether such substances were disposed at the facility during his period of ownership (Sullivan, 
1995).  As a result, once the treatment and disposal of hazardous substances has begun at a 
site, the site’s owner will have difficulty finding new buyers who are unafraid of the threat of 
liability.  In turn, the value of the property in its next best use is significantly reduced.
14
Under each type of asset specificity, the scope of opportunism is expanded.  Because 
their investments have discretely lower value in alternative applications, developers are 
effectively isolated from alternative trading opportunities and quasi-rents are thus created.  
Efforts to capture these rents are a source of contractual hazards.  When asset specificity is 
combined with additional hazards posed by measurement difficulties and negotiating 
externalities, governance mechanisms that facilitate exchange take on added importance.
III.3  GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS
Regulatory strategies arise to address these hazards, and states have developed a 
diverse array of regulatory forms to address both the different elements of the siting process 
and the siting of different facilities.  Consequently, a diverse assortment of regulations is 
available for review.
Critical to the TCE conception of governance mechanisms is the notion that institutions 
vary in their attributes, particularly along the dimensions of incentive intensity, administrative 
controls, and adaptation performance (Williamson 1996).
15 Governing institutions can be 
14 For a discussion of the difficulties posed by CERCLA liability for selling abandoned hazardous waste TSDFs, 
see Rubin (1997).
15 TCE also dimensionalizes governance according to contract law.  Each of the regulatory mechanisms discussed 
here fall under the same contract law regime, neoclassic contract law.  Faced with the prospective breakdown of 
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differentiated along a spectrum ranging from markets (with high incentive intensity, low 
administrative control, and autonomous adaptation) to hierarchies (with low incentive intensity, 
high administrative control, and coordinated adaptation).  Equally as significant, this spectrum 
includes numerous hybrid governing mechanisms that employ both market and hierarchical 
elements.   As was noted earlier, recent work by Williamson (1999) and Dixit (1996) has likened 
regulation to a hybrid mode of governance that lies within the market-hierarchy extremes.  
Moreover, regulations are not restricted to only one organizational form but instead embody a 
diverse collection of governing relationships. 
Some scholars, consistent with TCE terminology, have differentiated among and 
between assorted regulations according to the degree of institutional intervention they impose, 
i.e. how comparatively “market” or “hierarchical” they are.  These labels can be applied by 
applying traditional TCE distinctions: market regulation exhibits a greater degree of incentive 
intensity, less administrative control, and more autonomous adaptation as compared to 
hierarchical regulation.  Such characterizations of regulation, for example, are akin to 
distinctions drawn between incentive regulation, where government intervention could be said 
to assist the operation of the market while market mechanisms remain the primary forces that 
organize exchange, and command and control regulation, where government intervention is 
more direct and bureaucratic power is the primary force that organizes exchange (Baron 1995, 
Weidenbaum 1995).  State siting regulations for WFs likewise occupy this spectrum of 
variance, exhibiting both market and hierarchy attributes to varying degrees, and they 
accordingly range from comparatively market-oriented regulations to comparatively hierarchical 
regulations.  We distinguish three broad categories of siting regulation -- information enhancing, 
process enhancing, and market substituting -- and we discuss each in turn according to their 
location along this market-hierarchy spectrum. 
relations, additional governance structures (i.e. government regulation) are instituted to facilitate gap filling, 
dispute resolution and adaptation.
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1.  Information Enhancing Regulations.  The purpose of information enhancing 
regulations is to mitigate the hazards brought on by the information impactedness and 
measurement problems that were discussed above.  They are designed to facilitate a complete 
exchange of information between negotiating parties and to force the disclosure of private 
information when such information is deemed to be valuable to the opposing side.  They also 
imbue the exchange of information with greater credibility since parties are disclosing 
knowledge to comply with regulatory standards and not for negotiation posturing.
These regulations are comparatively “market” oriented since they are intended to 
support or provide added structure to market interactions. Information enhancing regulations 
are designed to fully inform the market players or to alter the incentives that these parties face. 
The regulations do not dictate how firms or private parties should behave in a given instance, 
and the relevant exchange is still controlled by the market players themselves.  Three important 
examples of information enhancing regulations that affect the siting process are:
• Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) -- The National Environmental Policy Act, 
enacted in 1969, requires that any federal action that significantly affects the human 
environment must be accompanied by an impact statement.  Most states have enacted 
similar statutes that expand the number of projects that require an impact statement --
typically any project requiring a state subsidy or permit.  The primary purpose of EISs is 
to increase the availability of information concerning new projects.
16
• Determination of Need Statements  -- A number of states require that developers 
provide a detailed statement of why a proposed facility is needed, alternative sites that 
were considered, and the justifications for picking a particular site.
• Demand and Supply Forecasts -- These statements, which may or may not be part of a 
determination of need statement, require that developers forecast the expected demand 
for a facility’s services and how the facility will meet that demand.
In addition to serving as vehicles for information exchange, however, these information 
enhancing regulations also serve as common tools of opposition, serving as effective means for 
delaying construction of an undesired facility.  In other words, for some transactions, invocation 
16 In addition to providing information to parties in siting negotiations, EISs have also become tools of opposition.  
EIS challenges are among the most effective means of delaying the construction od an undesired facility.  This 
view of EISs lends support to the PPT view of regulation discussed in section II.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press25
of these regulations may reflect intractable negotiating hazards instead of efforts to mitigate 
hazards.  For such transactions, information enhancing regulations may be insufficient in 
supporting efficient negotiation, and more hierarchical regulations, such as those we review 
below, may be required.
2. Process Enhancing Regulations.  Process enhancing regulations are rules that affect 
the process in which parties to a siting agreement negotiate. These regulations generally entail 
added state involvement in shaping how negotiations take place, thus making them more 
hierarchical than information enhancing regulations, but primary decision-making authority 
remains in the hands of the developer and the local negotiating parties, making these 
regulations largely market-oriented.  Three prominent examples of this type of regulation are:
• Formal Declaration of Parties -- These regulations create local negotiating committees 
that represent parties affected by a proposed facility.  They are designed to ensure 
comprehensive representation of local interests, and they grant legal standing to a 
representative body that is authorized to negotiate with a developer.  These regulations 
can mitigate negotiation externalities by precluding the option of individual negotiations 
and forcing collective bargaining.
• Public Participation Measures -- These regulatory measures are designed to allow broad 
(beyond the local negotiating committee) public involvement in the siting process.  
Specific public participation measures include public hearings, public representatives on 
siting and oversight boards, and “public counsels,” who are appointed by the state to 
represent the public in licensing and permitting proceedings.
• Negotiation / Arbitration Regulations -- These are regulations that provide added 
structure to the negotiations between developers and community representatives by 
specifying the timing of negotiations, penalties for refusing to negotiate in good faith, 
and specific dispute resolution mechanisms (such as binding arbitration before a state 
appointed arbitration board).
3.  Market Substituting Regulations.  The third broad category of siting regulations is 
market substituting regulations.  These regulations are the most hierarchical of the three 
categories and, unlike information and process enhancing regulations, they provide the state 
considerable power to preempt negotiations between developers and the local siting committee 
or overturn decisions made at the local level.  Regulatory measures in this category essentially 
substitute local decision-making with state mandates and, in TCE terminology, are 
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characterized more by administrative controls than by incentive intensity.  Two important 
examples of market substituting regulations in this context are:
• State Overrides -- These measures provide a state agency with veto authority over 
decisions made at the local level.  Overrides provide the power of reversal only after 
decisions have been made at the local level (OBS 1983; Morell & Magorian 1982).
17
• State Inventories and Ownership -- Under these measures, state officials are given the 
authority to inventory sites that are suitable for socially desirable facilities and to complete 
as much of the review process as possible before a developer expresses interest.  The goal 
is to complete a significant part of the siting process without provoking local opposition, thus 
protecting a developer from a political fight.  In a few states, officials not only review and 
inventory acceptable locations but also purchase the properties.  Developers then enter into 
negotiations with the state in order to purchase the land and begin construction.
18
To summarize, the potential hazards posed in siting WFs have led to the development 
of a host of regulatory mechanisms.  The primary purpose of these mechanisms is to facilitate 
cooperation in the siting of these locally undesirable but socially beneficial facilities.  While a 
variety of different state regulatory instruments have been employed, it is analytically useful to 
categorize these measures as information enhancing, process enhancing, and market 
substituting.  Our TCE analysis of these regulations places each category along a market-
hierarchy spectrum: market substituting regulations are the most hierarchical of this group, 
information enhancing regulations are the least hierarchical, and process enhancing regulations 
occupy the intermediate place along the spectrum.
III.4.  DISCRIMINATING ALIGNMENT
The fundamental hypothesis of TCE is that transactions, which differ in their attributes, 
are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, in a 
17 Exercising these regulations does not necessarily remove the developer’s incentive to negotiate with the host 
community.  These regulations certainly raises the developer’s reservation option, and consequently may change 
the content of these negotiations, but developers may still find value in entering into negotiations with 
community leaders (thus giving concurrent roles to other, less hierarchical regulations), 
18 It is important to point out that the use of state inventories does not imply that the local community is helpless to 
oppose undesirable facilities.  Rather, these measures simply remove an important piece of the siting process 
from local control.  Often overrides and inventories are combined with some form of negotiations between the 
developer and the local community.
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discriminating (mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) way (Williamson, 1996).  With respect to 
WFs, TCE predicts that siting transactions, the attributes of which pose differential hazards, will 
be accordingly aligned with regulatory mechanisms, which differ in their ability to remedy these 
hazards.
This paper identifies four types of WFs: solid waste landfills, solid waste incinerators, 
hazardous waste treatment facilities, and hazardous waste storage and disposal facilities.  The 
siting of each of these facilities represents a unique transaction -- the problems and issues that 
arise in relation to siting a landfill are different in important ways from the issues surrounding 
the siting of a hazardous waste site.  Each of these unique siting transactions has associated
with it attributes that pose potential hazards to the relationship between the developer and the 
host community.   These attributes, which include negotiation externalities, measurement 
problems, and asset specificity, differ across siting transactions.
After reviewing the literature associated with these various types of facilities, we attempt 
to quantify the presence of these hazards in each of the siting transactions noted above.
19 First, 
siting each facility requires a developer to attempt to negotiate with a collective of different 
parties, so each project will experience negotiating externalities.  There is, however, more 
differentiation in the degree of measurement problems and asset specificity that each of the 
different facilities exhibit.  Solid waste landfills present measurement problems in that they pose 
threats of seepage into water systems, odor, and other environmental dangers, but landfills 
generally deal with non-hazardous materials, so the risks to human health and the environment 
are relatively low.  In addition, those risks that do exist can be assuaged by using fairly simple 
technologies, and the transparency of the activities performed at landfills makes monitoring 
relatively simple.  Solid waste incinerators pose a greater degree of measurement problems 
19 The following sources were reviewed:  Kirk-Othmer Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology 4th ed., 20 (1996), 
Albert (1996), Office of Technology Assessment (1989), Blomquist (1974), Streeter (1979) and Payne (1987).  
Also consulted are notes from a colleague’s visits to solid and hazardous waste sites taken between January and 
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than landfills since they produce particulates and other air pollutants of varying dangers.  
However, with appropriate technology (which, incidentally, also can be hard to measure), air 
discharges from these facilities can also be monitored, and solid waste incinerators also deal 
mostly with non-hazardous materials.  Hazardous waste treatment facilities and hazardous 
waste disposal facilities pose the greatest measurement problems.  These facilities treat 
materials that genuinely do pose environmental risks, and they post threats through a variety of 
media (e.g. air, water, ground) that are hard to monitor and detect.  There also are often long 
latencies between a facility’s actions (e.g. an accidental spill) and health or environmental 
outcomes, so the impact of these facilities is largely uncertain and difficult to prove.
Asset specificity plays a role in each of these facilities as well.  Physical asset specificity 
is relatively low for landfills and solid waste incinerators as investments are typically generic and 
redeployable.  Landfills, for example, are routinely covered and made into parks, parking lots, or 
sold for industrial development.  These facilities generally are, however, built to service specific 
customers in the region and thus possess site specificity.  Hazardous waste treatment facilities 
similarly contain both physical and site specificity, but probably to a similar degree to landfills 
and incinerators.  Hazardous waste storage & disposal facilities contain the greatest asset 
specificity, as rigorous zoning requirements impose severe limitations as to where these may 
be sited, and hazardous materials preclude these sites from being employed for an alternative 
use.
In sum, we approximate that landfills have low measurement hazards and moderate 
asset specificity, solid waste incinerators have moderate measurement hazards and moderate 
asset specificity, hazardous waste treatment facilities have high measurement problems and 
moderate asset specificity, and hazardous waste storage and disposal facilities have high 
measurement problems and high asset specificity.  We place these four facilities in Appendix 
March 1995.  It must be stressed, however, that these are only preliminary estimates of hazards and are therefore 
only roughly comparative.
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Figure 2 according to their relative hazards, varying asset specificity along the X-axis and 
measurement problems along the Y-axis.  Since the discriminating alignment hypothesis 
predicts that transactions that pose added hazards will require additional governance 
mechanisms, this TCE analysis hypothesizes that landfills and solid waste incinerators will 
require less hierarchical regulations than will hazardous waste treatment or storage and 
disposal facilities in order to achieve efficient outcomes.  Given the above description of the 
alternative regulatory mechanisms, one could expect that the siting process for landfills and 
incinerators should be governed primarily by information enhancing and process enhancing 
regulations.  Alternatively, the siting process for hazardous waste treatment facilities and 
storage and disposal facilities will likely require additional supports and should, therefore, 
employ process enhancing and market substituting regulations.  These hypotheses are 
embodied in the diagonal dotted lines in Appendix Figure 2.  We construct Figure 2 to 
summarize these predictions and to graphically illustrate how increasing hazards (along either 
the X-axis and Y-axis) should prompt increasingly hierarchical governance mechanisms.  
Certainly, our hypotheses are not limited to two dimensions, and the exercise of aggregating 
the cumulative hazards associated with a certain transaction can continue as additional hazards 
are incorporated into the analysis. For example, one can imagine three-dimensional Figure 2 
(which would look like a pyramid on its side) that measures three different hazards along axes 
X, Y, and Z and places increasingly hierarchical regulations in the three-dimensional spaces 
that expand away from the origin.  Considering more than two hazards involves the same 
approach used in the two-dimensional analysis (though hazards may need to be weighted 
differently), and the central feature in Figure 2 is that it diagrams the additive nature of 
incorporating different hazards into the TCE analysis. 
SECTION IV: PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE
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The primary purpose of this paper is to develop a TCE approach to 
understanding siting regulations.  While a formal empirical test of the predictions developed 
here is beyond the scope of this introductory paper, the selected case studies below  illustrate 
how the regulatory governance mechanisms discussed in the sections above can support the 
siting of socially desirable facilities or, when either absent or inadequately designed for the 
nature of the intended transactions, fail to support siting such facilities.   We note that this 
approach does not assume ex-post efficiency.  In other words, some regulations, whether from 
poor policy making or other limited judgments, are actually inappropriately aligned with the 
transactions they are intended to govern. We believe that this is a fair assumption.  While the 
difficulties in siting WFs have seriously impeded necessary projects for approximately 30 years, 
few states have experimented with process enhancing regulations that facilitate siting 
negotiations, and there are insufficient competitive forces to drive optimal regulatory outcomes.  
This is partly because the political process is not a market with a “free-entry” condition, and 
feedback mechanisms to address inefficient policies are rarely effective. Consequently, we 
assume that there are regulatory “misalignments” that lead to Pareto inferior results, and 
examining both regulatory successes and failures can inform how regulatory devices can 
govern particular economic activity in a transaction-cost minimizing way.
IV.1. THREE CASE STUDIES
While examining case studies is restricted to small sample sizes and thus may not 
support any generalizability of the TCE hypothesis, a careful analysis of specific instances 
where siting WFs encountered political opposition can serve some important purposes.  First, it 
illuminates the microanalytic dimensions of the siting process and reveals the specific hazards 
of an individual transaction: what concerns local residents, how concerns translate into political 
pressures, and how negotiations between conflicting parties progress (or fail to progress).  
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Second, it illustrates both the role regulation plays, when present, to support the transactions 
and the consequences that ensue when adequate regulation is not present.  And third, a case-
study examination of assorted disputes in different municipalities introduces variation in both 
the type of transaction and the nature of the regulatory regime.  The three case studies below 
each present a different pairing of a NIMBY project with a governance mechanism: the first is 
an effort to site a solid waste incinerator under a regime of only information enhancing 
regulations; the second is a landfill project under a regime of information enhancing and 
process enhancing regulations; and the third is a hazardous waste facility being sited under 
information enhancing and process enhancing regulations.  The success of the second and the 
failures of the first and third yield some interesting conclusions that support our hypotheses.
1.  Philadelphia 1988.  Throughout the late 1980s, landfills were being closed across the
Northeast and major urban centers were facing waste disposal crises.  By 1988, Philadelphia, 
perhaps more than any other city, was facing a severe disposal crisis.  Disposal costs per ton 
had nearly tripled since 1983, and low capacity in nearby landfills forced the city to dump much 
of its solid waste in sites as far away as Columbus, Ohio.
20 21  The city frantically searched for 
new sites.  One proposal tried to persuade the city of Houston to accept some of its solid waste, 
other attempts propositioned sites in Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia.
22 23  Meanwhile, a 
barge named The Khian Sea carrying 14,000 tons of Philadelphia’s waste had been roaming 
the seas for nearly two years searching for a dumping site.
24
Some cities began to increasingly rely on trash incinerators, which could reduce the 
volume of solid waste by as much as 90%.
25  Philadelphia at the time had two operating trash 
20 “Where Will We Put All That Garbage?”  Fortune, 4/11/88.
21 “Houston Fights Proposal to Import Philadelphia Trash.”  Reuters, 2/3/88.
22 “Trash Disposal Crisis.”  LA Times, 9/2/88.
23 “Trash Disposal Problem Besieging Philadelphia.” NY Times, 2/20/88..
24 ibid.
25 LA Times, 9/2/88.
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incinerators, but they operated on outdated technology, were known to be environmental 
hazards, and had prompted 20 years of demands for their closure.
26  The city’s administration, 
as Mayor W. Wilson Goode began his second term in January 1988, proposed construction of 
a new “trash-to-steam” facility that would replace the two older incinerators.  The proposal was 
designed to address the waste disposal crisis while bringing better, more environment-friendly 
technology to trash disposal.  Deputy Mayor Marjorie Adler, testifying on April 13, 1988 before 
the Philadelphia City Council, argued that the new trash incinerator would stabilize the city’s 
long-term trash disposal costs by reducing its dependence on expensive landfills while 
minimizing the environmental and health costs associated with trash incineration.
27  Addressing 
these health concerns, the administration cited a panel of medical experts who determined that 
the health effect of emissions from the proposed plant would be equal to “one person smoking 
two cigarettes or drinking two Diet Cokes in a lifetime.”
28
The trash-to-steam proposal would seem to be able to generate an increase in overall 
surplus, making it potentially Pareto improving.  It would have reduced overall incinerator 
emissions while disposing more solid waste and reducing expenses on waste disposal.  Indeed, 
one poll showed that most Philadelphians favored the project for the new incinerator, and 
support was as high as 70% in many neighborhoods.
29  However, the siting process devolved 
into a classic NIMBY political battle as a vocal Trash-to-Steam Alternative Coalition emerged 
from the South Philadelphia neighborhood near where the proposed facility would be sited.  The 
coalition flexed its political muscle before city council and brought a “foot-stomping, sign-
waving” gang of citizens to the Council’s hearings.
30  They mounted what one administration 
official called “as fierce opposition as anyone could imagine.”
31
26 Fortune, 4/11/88.
27 “It Was Familiar Opposition to a Familiar Proposal.”  Philadelphia Inquirer, 4/14/88.
28 NY Times, 2/20/88.
29 “Trash: The Boomerang’s Back.”  Philadelphia Inquirer, 4/18/88.
30 Phila Inquirer, 4/14/88.
31 LA Times, 9/2/88.
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Because the project required the city to offer a bond issue to raise the necessary capital 
funds, the project needed City Council approval.  It did not benefit from an expedited regulatory 
siting mechanism and instead needed to pass through the open political process.  
Consequently, as the administration attempted to enter into negotiations with interested parties, 
local opposition rounded up Councilmembers to block the proposal.  One of South 
Philadelphia’s advocates continued to rail against the proposal, threatening “to fight this thing 
until I’m not here anymore,” and other members joined suit.
32  The opposition expressed itself 
through adamant neighborhood groups, grandstanding politicians, and public interest 
representatives.  The diversity of interests involved in the opposition created further difficulties 
for the administration to negotiate a settlement, making coordinated bargaining substantially 
more difficult, and talks continued fruitlessly into the summer.  Mayor Goode eventually 
resigned to call the plan “dead” on July 27, 1988 and bitterly noted that residents will 
consequently face higher trash disposal bills.
33
Why was the administration unable to mobilize its majority support and reach a
negotiated settlement with the South Philadelphia residents?  Much of the answer lies in the 
hazards inherent in siting waste incinerators.  Jerome Balter, a spokesperson for opponents of 
the project, accused administration officials of misrepresenting the plant’s safety standards.
34
Other opponents often cited many other potentially harmful effects incinerators may cause --
airborne dioxins, particulates, and ash -- despite the noted improvements in incinerator 
technology.  As one industry expert observed, “it’s very clear that the technologies for new 
plants are a lot better, but it always comes down to a value judgement.  Building up public 
confidence is a very critical factor.”
35  In short, the complexity of the information, or information 
impactedness, presented contracting hazards in the negotiations and impeded efficient 
32 Phila Inquirer, 4/14/88.
33 “Philadelphia Mayor: Trash-to-Steam Plan Dead.”  U.P.I., 7/27/88.
34 Phila Inquirer, 4/14/88.
35 LA Times, 9/2/88.
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bargaining from arriving at a resolution.  These hazards were further complicated by negotiating 
externalities, which impeded coordinated negotiation and any serious attempt to address
specific concerns.
The Philadelphia case is one where a new incinerator was likely to be potentially Pareto 
improving, but contracting difficulties caused the proposal to fall victim to the political process.  
Were a more hierarchical governance mechanism to support the siting process, like the one 
used in the following case study, Philadelphia may have been able to address its waste 
disposal crisis with a new incinerator.
Dane County, Wisconsin 1992.  Though the Madison, WI metropolitan area was not 
experiencing a waste disposal crisis quite like Philadelphia, the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR) forecasted that municipalities in Dane and surrounding counties 
would need new landfill space soon.
36  In response to anticipated rising demand, Browning-
Ferris Industries (BFI) proposed to expand its Madison-Prarie landfill from 22 to 44 acres and to 
accept municipal waste in addition to the industrial waste it then received.
Opposition immediately emerged.  Local residents feared traffic congestion, odor, and 
damage to local enterprise.  Further worries came from the nearby Dane County Regional 
Airport, which feared that the landfill would attract additional birds and bring danger to planes 
using their runways.  The most vocal opponent was American Family Insurance, whose 
corporate headquarters were 4,700 feet from the planned expansion.  American Family brought 
a suit against BFI and organized protests at the Wisconsin State Capitol.
37
Nonetheless, the DNR conducted an environmental impact statement and declared the 
proposed expansion to be safe.
38  Yet this did little to allay opponents fears.  Citizens first 
argued that the DNR’s report was incomplete since it did not consider the “economic and social 
36 “Landfill Expansion Approved; Opponents to Continue Fight.”  Wisconsin State Journal, 2/8/92.
37 Landfill Foes will Protest at Capitol.” Capital Times, 3/12/92.
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impact the larger landfill would have on the nearby community.”
39  In addition, American Family 
disputed the results of the DNR study arguing it overlooked the severity of contamination 
caused by a nearby landfill that would be exacerbated by the expansion, though BFI countered 
that new technologies in lining landfills would preclude seepage and consequent contamination 
of local groundwater.
40  As opposition grew throughout the spring, the DNR eventually bowed to 
public pressure and released a second study in June 1992 admitting that the landfill may 
impose some environmental and economic costs that warrant concern.
When the dispute entered July, little progress had been made.  Despite the region’s 
growing needs for waste disposal, a vocal opposition had organized and vowed to fight the 
project.  Multiple parties opposed the landfill expansion and mounted individual challenges to 
block its approval, creating negotiating externalities that would complicate any effort to enter 
into bargaining.  Furthermore, environmental impact statements, designed to facilitate 
information between BFI and local residents, did little to clarify the landfill’s effects and reduce 
measurement problems.  Multiple hazards seemed to preclude efficient bargaining, and one 
might have anticipated a stalemate similar to what occurred in Philadelphia.
However, Wisconsin in 1980 instituted new siting procedures, consisting primarily of 
information and process enhancing regulations, aimed to overcome the NIMBY problem (Ruud 
& Werner 1985).  First, the landfill siting process mandates the establishment of a “local 
committee” of affected municipalities to represent interested parties.  This committee becomes 
the authorized representative for local interests and is the exclusive negotiating partner with the 
developer.  Thus, regulations mandating a local committee preclude opportunities to shirk from 
negotiations and minimize negotiating externalities.  Second, the landfill siting process 
administers the negotiations between parties and requires them to bargain in good faith or 
38 “DNR Calls Madison Prairie Landfill Safe.” Capital Times, 2/7/92.
39 “American Family Rips Mad-Prarie Plan.” Capital Times, 3/13/92.
40 “Foes Cite Toxins by Dump.” Capital Times, 3/26/92.
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otherwise face binding arbitration or other undesirable consequences.
41  To facilitate BFI’s 
negotiations with the local committee, the Municipal Waste Siting Board, which supervised the 
negotiations, scheduled public hearings that resemble a court trial where parties are subjected 
to scrutiny by each other and by state environmental officials.  The hearing, scheduled for the 
mid-fall and to last several weeks, provided an impetus to all parties involved to enter into 
rigorous negotiations to reach a settlement.
42
In mid-October, both BFI and American Family made substantial concessions and 
pushed negotiations toward fruitful results.
43  On February 4, 1993, a creative agreement was 
finalized.  BFI would expand the landfill but only to receive additional industrial waste, thereby
not accepting municipal waste that would attract birds that may endanger the local airport.  BFI 
would further pledge not to seek to further expand the landfill, limit the number of daily truck 
trips, limit the landfill’s height, and plant trees and implement other landscaping to minimize the 
visual and aesthetic impact of the site.  BFI would also establish a “neighbor to neighbor” group 
consisting of members from BFI, American Family, and other interested parties to discuss 
additional concerns to nearby residents.
44  Thus, the agreement compromised on 
environmental, economic, and monitoring issues while still alleviating the region’s need for solid 
waste disposal.  
In sum, while numerous elements of the siting transaction may have potentially blocked 
a final agreement, the siting regulatory process mitigated specific contracting hazards and 
created a process wherein bargaining led to a final resolution.  The Wisconsin regulations are 
notable in that they employed both market and hierarchical elements.  They intervened with 
information and process enhancing regulations that directed how parties may proceed, but they 
allowed the resolution to arrive chiefly through market-oriented negotiations.  According to the 
41 “Wisconsin’s Landfill Siting Process.”  http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/aw/wm/solid/landfill/
42 “Landfill Firm Rips State About-Face.”  Capital Times, 7/2/92.
43 “Landfill Won’t Take Municipal Waste.”  Capital Times, 10/12/92.
44 “Madison-Prairie Landfill Deal to Relieve Rodefeld.” Capital Times, 10/13/92.
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TCE discriminating alignment hypothesis, this institutional arrangement is comparatively optimal 
for some transactions – like landfills – where contracting hazards are moderate, but it may not 
be effective in supporting transactions with greater hazards, as the Massachusetts case 
illustrates below.
Massachusetts 1990.  In 1980, Massachusetts passed regulations that instituted a 
similar siting process as Wisconsin’s, implementing information and process enhancing 
regulations that were designed to force negotiated settlements between developers and local
committees.  The Massachusetts law, however, extended to siting hazardous waste facilities in 
addition to landfills and consequently has exhibited very little success.  In the first twelve years 
the law came into force, five proposals for hazardous waste facilities were offered and none 
began construction.
Examining the case study of the Clean Harbors proposal can illuminate how the 
negotiation-based siting process failed in Massachusetts.
45  In May 1987, Clean Harbors filed 
its notice of intent to expand its existing hazardous waste transfer station in a highly 
industrialized section of Braintree, near Boston.  The incinerator would destroy some waste on-
site rather than transporting it to other facilities as far away as Alabama and Arizona, thus 
saving significant hauling and disposal costs.  In October 1987, in accordance with the siting 
procedures, the proposal was deemed “feasible and deserving” by the state regulators, and a 
local committee was formed by nearby municipalities to enter into siting negotiations.
The process continued as planned though the following year, with Clean Harbors 
completing its initial environmental surveys and satisfying its regulatory obligations.  But in 
September 1989, the local committee decided to withdraw altogether from negotiations with 
Clean Harbors.  So, while Clean Harbors continued to receive approval from the state’s 
environmental regulators and advance through the regulatory process, the local committee 
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refused to participate in negotiations and instead remained organized to fight the project in the 
political arena.  Gradually, the state politicians responded to local residents’ protests.  First, the 
secretary of environmental affairs required Clean Harbors to submit a supplemental 
environmental impact statement (here likely being used as a delay tactic and not as a device to 
facilitate information exchange) and later to request permission from additional state agencies.  
Meanwhile, as the review process slowed during the spring and summer of 1990, local 
residents solicited Massachusetts’ gubernatorial candidates to oppose the plan (all five did so 
by September 1990).  Later that month, additional dissent came from state agencies, and the 
state’s Site Safety Council, which twice before approved the proposed facility, ruled that the 
project was no longer “feasible and deserving” of state support.  Clean Harbors then saw it was 
losing the political battle and decided not to appeal the decision, ending its effort to expand its 
facility without ever meeting to negotiate with the local committee.
Why did the negotiation-based process work for a landfill in Wisconsin but not a 
hazardous waste incinerator in Massachusetts?  According to O’Hare & Sanderson (1993), the 
project failed “because many of the site’s neighbors did not believe it could lead to an outcome 
acceptable to them; partly because the state’s political leadership gave neighbors, and the 
developer, no reason to believe it would protect the siting process or the case for hazardous 
waste facilities itself from localized attack; and partly because the neighbors simply could not 
understand the health issues and were at best ill-served by the state agencies concerned with 
them” (pg. 369-70).  This evaluation provides two explanations for the projects failure: first, the
process did not ensure a credible commitment to either the developer or the residents that an 
agreement would be in their interest, or in other words, there was inadequate governance 
supporting the transaction.  And second, the nature of the information was too complex and 
impacted to make efficient bargaining possible.  Siting Wisconsin’s landfill may have introduced 
some measurement hazards and other contracting problems, but siting the hazardous waste 
45 The Clean Harbors case study is adapted from O’Hare & Sanderson (1993).
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facility near Boston created far greater measurement problems and gave rise for greater 
opposition.  The market-oriented regulations broke down because coordinated negotiation 
could not credibly support a transaction with excessive hazards.  This observation is consistent 
with TCE theory, since transactions laden with such hazards require more hierarchical 
governance.
The three case studies, taken together, offer preliminary evidence, and some interesting 
insights, into the TCE approach to siting regulations.  Since siting WFs involve contracting 
hazards, some kind of governance mechanism is required to support the transaction.  Thus, the 
Philadelphia case study illustrates how an attempt to site an incinerator with only information 
enhancing regulations led to failure.  Alternatively, Wisconsin’s information and process 
enhancing regulation provided sufficient institutional intervention and governance to support 
negotiations and allowed the project to proceed through comparatively market means. This 
regulatory regime, however, proved to be appropriate only for certain types of transactions.  
The same regulations failed in Massachusetts when it attempted to facilitate siting a project that 
was hampered by greater hazards.  According to the TCE discriminating alignment hypothesis, 
a more hierarchical governance mechanism would be required for hazardous waste facilities.
SECTION V: CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to begin outlining a logic of regulation with respect to the 
siting of WFs.  Unlike existing approaches to the NIMBY problem, which seek to critique and 
improve upon state siting regulations, this paper seeks to develop a theoretical foundation 
articulating the functions these regulations are designed to accomplish and which types of 
transactions they are able to support.  Utilizing a TCE framework, the attributes of siting 
transactions are defined and the costs and competencies of various alternative governance 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art1040
mechanisms are explored.  A discriminating alignment is then posed in which specific siting 
transactions are matched to governance structures in order to achieve efficient outcomes (i.e. 
site necessary facilities).  A preliminary review of three separate cases suggests that this 
framework may provide important insights into the use of government regulation to facilitate 
cooperation between developers and local host communities. 
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